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Abstract
The nancial crisis of 2008/2009 has left European economies with
a sizeable public debt stock bringing back the question what factors
help to reduce these scal imbalances. Using data for the period 1985-
2009 this paper identies factors determining major public debt reduc-
tions. On average, the total debt reduction per country amounted to
almost 37 percentage points of GDP. We estimate several specications
of a logistic probability model. Our ndings suggest that, rst, ma-
jor debt reductions are mainly driven by decisive and lasting (rather
than timid and short-lived) scal consolidation eorts focused on re-
ducing government expenditure, in particular, cuts in social benets
and public wages. Second, robust real GDP growth also increases the
likelihood of a major debt reduction because it helps countries to \grow
their way out" of indebtedness. Third, high debt servicing costs play
a disciplinary role strengthened by market forces and require govern-
ments to set up credible plans to stop and reverse the increasing debt
ratios.
JEL classication: C35, E62, H6
Keywords: Fiscal policy, public debt, binary choice models5
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Non-technical summary
In the course of the nancial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 rising budget
decits, low economic growth and the unprecedented government inter-
ventions to support nancial institutions resulted in the accumulation of
sizeable public debt in the European Union (EU). As rising debt levels can
trigger a decline of investor condence in governments' creditworthiness and
raise doubts about the sustainability of government nances, it is of utmost
importance to analyze the factors determining major public debt reductions.
In a rst step, a stylized analysis of major public debt reduction in the
EU since 1985 shows that most of the episodes of major debt reductions
spanned over a relatively long time horizon. The time span of episodes
ranges from ve years in Portugal to fourteen years in Belgium and
Denmark. The relatively long time span of major episodes indicates that
the debt reductions were remarkably large and persistent. On average over
the countries, the impact from major debt reductions amounted to 36.9
percentage points of GDP and reached up to 69.2 percentage points in the
case of Ireland.
In a second step, this paper estimates several specications of a logistic
probability model to assess which factors determine the probability of a
major debt reduction in the EU-15 during the period 1985-2009. Our
results are three-fold. First, major debt reductions are mainly driven by
decisive and lasting (rather than timid and short-lived) scal consolidation
eorts focused on reducing government expenditure, in particular, cuts in
social benets and public wages. Revenue-based consolidations seem to
have a tendency to be less successful. Second, robust real GDP growth
also increases the likelihood of a major debt reduction because it helps
countries to \grow their way out" of indebtedness. Here, the literature also6
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points to a positive feedback eect with decisive expenditure-based scal
consolidation because this type of consolidation appears to foster growth,
in particular in times of severe scal imbalances. Third, high debt servicing
costs play a disciplinary role strengthened by market forces and require
governments to set up credible plans to stop and reverse the increasing debt
ratios.
The present paper oers several extensions to the previous research work on
debt reductions. So far the existing literature predominantly focused on debt
reduction periods which were strongly linked to scal consolidation eorts.
More precisely, only those public debt reductions were considered which were
the result of a sizeable improvement in either the primary balance or the
cyclically adjusted primary balance. Other potential determinants of public
debt reductions such as business cycle developments and the magnitude of
debt servicing costs were largely left unattended. It is the aim of the present
paper to assess the relevant driving forces of large public debt reductions in
a wider scope. By dening a major debt reduction as a lasting and decisive
improvement in the public debt-to-GDP ratio we can observe the debt re-
duction episodes directly and assess what factors determine the probability
of a major debt reduction. In our empirical analysis we, therefore, do not
only concentrate on scal actions as potential determinants but also control
for the trend growth and the output gap as well as the interest burden.7
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1 Introduction
In the course of the nancial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 rising
budget decits, low economic growth and the unprecedented government
interventions to support nancial institutions resulted in the accumulation
of sizeable public debt in the European Union. The general government
gross debt-to-GDP ratio of the EU is estimated to rise from 79 to around
89 percent during the period 2009-2011 (European Commission, 2010). As
rising debt levels can trigger a decline of investor condence in governments'
creditworthiness and raise doubts about the sustainability of government
nances, it is of utmost importance to analyze the factors determining
major public debt reductions. Against this background this paper analyzes
past episodes of reductions in the general government gross debt-to-GDP
ratio in the EU-15 to provide insights on policy options for major debt
reductions in the future.
Based on the estimations of several specications of a logistic probability
model, we assess which factors determine the probability of a major debt
reduction in the EU-15 during the period 1985-2009. Our results are three-
fold. First, major debt reductions are mainly driven by decisive and lasting
(rather than timid and short-lived) scal consolidation eorts focused on
reducing government expenditure, in particular, cuts in social benets and
public wages. Revenue-based consolidations seem to have a tendency to be
less successful. Second, robust real GDP growth also increases the likelihood
of a major debt reduction because it helps countries to \grow their way
out" of indebtedness. Here, the literature also points to a positive feedback
eect with decisive expenditure-based scal consolidation because this type
of consolidation appears to foster growth, in particular in times of severe
scal imbalances. Third, high debt servicing costs play a disciplinary role
strengthened by market forces and require governments to set up credible
plans to stop and reverse the increasing debt ratios.8
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The present paper oers several extensions to the previous research work
on debt reductions. So far the existing literature predominantly focused on
debt reduction periods which were strongly linked to scal consolidation
eorts. More precisely, only those public debt reductions were considered
which were the result of a sizeable improvement in either the primary
balance or the cyclically adjusted primary balance. Other potential
determinants of public debt reductions such as business cycle developments
and the magnitude of debt servicing costs were largely left unattended. It
is the aim of the present paper to assess the relevant driving forces of large
public debt reductions in a wider scope. By dening a major debt reduction
as a lasting and decisive improvement in the public debt-to-GDP ratio we
can observe the debt reduction episodes directly and assess what factors
determine the probability of a major debt reduction. In our empirical
analysis we, therefore, do not only concentrate on scal actions as potential
determinants but also control for the trend growth and the output gap
as well as the interest burden. In a second step we further assess the
eectiveness of dierent scal actions for a major debt reduction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some
stylized facts on debt developments in EU-15 countries since 1985 and
provides a short overview of the related literature. Section 3 denes the
episodes of a major debt reduction and describes the data set. Section 4
sets up the empirical analysis framework and discusses the main results.
Section 5 summarizes the main ndings of the study and concludes.
2 Stylised facts and literature overview
In response to the nancial and economic crisis of 2008/2009, governments
and central banks provided substantial support to the nancial sector and
massively intervened to restore economic activity, by allowing automatic sta-9
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bilisers to operate and by providing additional discretionary scal stimulus.
This resulted in a signicant deterioration of scal balances and an accumu-
lation of large public debt. The rising public debt ratios in the EU-15 raise
the question of what factors will help to stabilise these ratios and then put
them on a steadily declining path. An analysis of successful past experience
in the EU-15 countries provides valuable insights when considering potential
policy options for debt reduction in the future. Table 1 provides informa-
tion on the evolution of general government gross debt-to-GDP ratios in the
EU-15.
Table 1: Evolution of general government gross debt-to-GDP ratios
1985 1995 2000 2005 2010f
EU 15 51.0 69.6 63.1 64.2 81.8
Austria 48.0 68.3 66.4 63.7 73.9
Belgium 115.1 129.8 107.8 92.2 101.2
Denmark 74.7 72.5 51.7 37.1 35.3
Finland 16.0 56.7 43.8 41.4 47.4
France 30.6 55.5 57.3 66.4 82.5
Germany 39.5 55.6 59.7 67.8 76.7
Greece 49.0 99.2 101.8 98.8 124.9
Ireland 100.6 81.1 37.7 27.5 82.9
Italy 80.5 121.5 109.2 105.8 116.7
Luxembourg 10.3 7.4 6.4 6.1 16.4
Netherlands 69.7 76.1 53.8 51.8 65.6
Portugal 58.4 61.0 50.4 63.6 84.6
Spain 41.4 62.7 59.2 43.0 66.3
Sweden 60.9 72.1 53.6 51.0 43.6
UK 51.8 50.8 41.0 42.3 80.3
Note: Debt gures in the Maastricht delineation, expressed in percent of GDP. The gures are based on ESA
(European System of Accounts) 79 until 1993 and on ESA 95 from 1994 onwards.
 Debt gures for Germany before 1991 refer to West-Germany.
f Forecast values Source: European Commission, 2009, AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic Data) database.
As can be seen from Table 1, debt-to-GDP ratios followed an upward
trend over the period 1985-1995 before they leveled o during the period
2000-2005. The debt ratios build up in the period from 1985-1995 cannot be
traced back to severe economic downturns or military conicts but rather to
changes in the level and structure of government spending (Hauptmeier et
al., 2007). The modern welfare state was expanded in this period implying
an acceleration of public spending (Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2003).10
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The evolution of the debt ratio for the EU-15 as a whole masks marked
dierences in the development of debt ratios across the individual EU-15
countries. While a number of countries, i.e. Belgium, Finland, and Ireland,
which accumulated sizeable public debt during the period 1985-1995,
experienced large debt reductions during the period 1995-2005. Other
countries with high debt ratios such as France and Germany have hardly
seen any improvement in their public debt positions so far.
2.1 Macroeconomic eects of high public debt
One major concern about rising debt ratios relates to their sustainability.
As debt ratios increase, investor condence in governments' creditworthi-
ness may decline. This pushes interest rates up as debt holders demand
a higher risk premium, which in turn burdens the sustainability of public
debt further. In particular expectations about future potential growth,
real interest rates and governments' ability to generate primary surpluses
play a crucial role in assessing whether public debt is on a sustainable
path. Therefore, a one-time increase in public debt does not necessarily
constitute a threat to the sustainability. If, however, market participants
consider the debt accumulation to be of structural nature, doubts about
the sustainability might arise (Buiter, 2005). Apart from sustainability
concerns, high public debt levels may directly or indirectly harm economic
growth (Checherita and Rother, 2010; Kumar and Woo, 2010; Reinhart
and Rogo, 2010). The channel most frequently discussed in this context
refers to the crowding-out of private investment. Public debt competes with
private debt for the allocation of savings. To the extent that public debt is
used to nance productive government expenditure and the availability of
debt instruments that combine high liquidity with low risk could result in
higher savings but not necessarily in lower capital accumulation. However,
if the debt-to-GDP ratio increases persistently over time, the newly issued11
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bonds can only be absorbed by the market participants if they yield higher
real returns, with a consequent crowding-out of private investment.
Empirical evidence also points to a nonlinear relationship between public
nances and private savings. Namely, households tend to increase pre-
cautionary savings when the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches the 100% mark
(Nickel and Vansteenkiste, 2008). Furthermore, high debt levels reduce
the exibility of scal policy to respond to economic shocks. Indeed,
countries with high debt levels were more restrictive in their responses to
the 2008/2009 nancial crisis than countries with relatively lower debt levels.
2.2 Previous work on successful public debt reduction
So far substantial research eorts have examined the developments of
public debt in advanced economies almost exclusively within the scal
consolidation analyses. Two strands of literature are predominant in this
respect. The rst strand of literature concentrates on debt sustainability
and explores which scal action stabilizes public debt. In this context
several studies introduce an econometric approach to estimate whether
public debt is a mean reverting process and whether governments of
advanced economies are able to stabilize public debt in times of high debt
levels by running scal surpluses. To analyze whether governments satisfy
the intertemporal budget constraint many researchers focus their analysis
on the test of the no-Ponzi game condition (e.g. Bohn, 1995 and 1998;
Greiner et al., 2007). In this context Rompuy and Vanhorebeek (1995)
apply the test for stationarity on the primary budget balances and the
debt-to-GDP ratios to a sample of eight European countries over the period
1970-1994. While their results indicate sustainable public debt ratios in
the UK, they reject the sustainability hypothesis for France, Denmark and
Germany. Several other studies such as by Bravo and Silvestre (2002) and12
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Afonso (2005) apply the test for cointegration between government revenues
and government expenditures in order to examine the sustainability hy-
pothesis for a sample of selected EU countries. Given that the conventional
cointegration tests lack power in relatively short time series, more recent
studies introduce the panel cointegration framework to test for debt sus-
tainability. Based on the test for panel cointegration between the primary
budget balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio, Prohl and Schneider (2006)
nd that the scal policy is consistent with the intertemporal budget con-
straint for a panel of fteen EU member countries over the period 1970-2004.
The second strand of literature touches upon public debt reductions within
the analysis of large scal adjustment programmes (e.g. Giavazzi and
Pagano, 1990 and 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1995 and 1997; Afonso et
al., 2006). Though the empirical evidence is relatively scarce and largely
based on OECD countries and prominent case studies, this second strand
supports the view of expansionary eects on growth of large scal consolida-
tions.1 These expansionary eects are likely to occur in countries with high
levels of government debt and a strong deterioration of the budgetary out-
look, where consumer and business condence might be heavily depressed
because of fears over scal sustainability. These eects can occur if scal
consolidations are large, persistent and credible, and if the scal adjust-
ment programmes are implemented mostly on the expenditure side (and not
the revenue side) as cuts in public employment, transfers and government
wages.2
1These positive eects of scal consolidations on growth are also referred to as \non-
Keynesian eects". While according to the traditional Keynesian theory, reductions in
budget decits can harm economic growth especially in the short run, non-Keynesian
eects are associated with positive expectational eects which oset the standard negative
Keynesian eect on growth.
2For a comprehensive literature overview see, for instance, Afonso (2001) and van Aarle
and Garretsen (2003).13
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To evaluate the success of scal actions, some researchers estimate logit or
probit specications where the dependent variable assumes the value of one
if scal tightening is successful and the value of zero if it is not successful.
For instance, McDermott and Wescott (1996) estimate logit models for
the OECD countries. They dene an episode of scal consolidation as
one in which the primary structural balance improves by at least 1.5
percentage points over two years and does not decrease in either of the
two years. Within these episodes a successful scal adjustment is dened
as one in which the two-year scal tightening leads to a sizeable public
debt reduction. Their ndings are two-fold. Their results suggest that
the greater the magnitude of the scal tightening the more likely it is to
succeed in reducing the debt ratios. Further, they nd that in contrast
to revenue-based consolidation expenditure-based consolidation tends to
increase the probability of a successful adjustment. Numerous studies
have applied a similar empirical methodology to analyse the success of
scal actions and derive comparable results (Giavazzi et al., 2000; EC, 2003).
3 Determining episodes of public debt
accumulation and reduction
As we are interested in the economic factors which contribute to a sizeable
reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio, we rst split our sample into two
groups. The rst represents episodes of debt accumulation or stagnation,
in which the year-on-year change in the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio is
zero or positive. The second group represents episodes of debt reduction,
in which the year-on-year change in the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio is
negative. Further, we split the second group into two subgroups represent-
ing major and modest episodes of debt reductions, respectively. We dene
a major debt reduction as follows: Among all negative year-on-year changes
of the gross general government debt-to-GDP ratio, we dene an episode14
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as major if the debt ratio declines by more than 10 percentage points in 5
consecutive years.3 Setting this rather demanding threshold with respect to
the size of the debt reduction and the period, we identify on the one hand
major debt reductions and on the other hand persistent and long lasting
improvements in the debt ratios. Using data from the AMECO database
of the European Commission for the period 1985-2009, we identify 184
episodes of debt accumulation and 191 episodes of debt reduction in the
EU-15. Among the debt reduction periods 59 episodes are considered as
major and the remaining 132 episodes as modest according to our denition.
3.1 Assessing episodes of major debt reduction
According to our denition 10 out of 15 countries experienced at least one
major and persistent debt reduction during the period 1985-2009. Table 2
reports all the major debt reduction episodes identied for each country
under consideration.
Most of the episodes ofmajor debt reductions span over a relatively long
time horizon. The time span of episodes ranges from ve years in Portugal
to fourteen years in Belgium and Denmark. The relatively long time span
of these episodes indicates that the debt reductions were remarkably large
and persistent. On average over the countries, the impact from major debt
reductions amounted to 36.9 percentage points of GDP and reached up to
69.2 percentage points in the case of Ireland.
3To test the robustness of our results we also examine an alternative denition of a
major debt reduction episode in Section 4.3.15
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Table 2: Periods of major public debt reduction (1985-2009)
Period of
major debt Change in
reduction Debt ratio debt ratio




Belgium 1994-2007 134.2 84.0 -50.2
Denmark 1994-2007 80.1 26.8 -53.2
Finland 1997-2002 56.9 41.3 -15.6




Ireland 1994-2006 94.1 24.9 -69.2
Italy 1996-2003 121.5 104.4 -17.1
Luxembourg
Netherlands 1996-2002 76.1 50.5 -25.6
Portugal 1996-2000 61.0 50.4 -10.6
Spain 1997-2007 66.8 36.2 -30.6
Sweden 1985-1990 61.2 41.2 -20.0
1996-2000 72.1 53.6 -18.5
2003-2008 52.6 38.0 -14.6
UK 1985-1990 52.4 33.3 -19.1
1997-2002 51.0 37.5 -13.5
Note: Debt gures in the Maastricht denition, expressed in percent of GDP. The gures are based on ESA
(European System of Accounts) 79 until 1993 and on ESA 95 from 1994 onwards.
Source: European Commission, 2009, AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic Data) database.
Further, it is interesting to note that major debt reductions in the EU-15 are
concentrated in the years 1995 through 2000 with more than 50 percent of
all observations occurring in this period. This nding may also be explained
by the incentive that the goal of becoming a euro area member and ful-
lling the Maastricht convergence criteria gave to decit and debt reduction.
While some countries, such as Finland, Sweden and UK experienced two
to three periods of large debt reductions during the time span under
consideration, other countries, such as Austria, France, Germany, Greece
and Luxembourg did not experience any episodes of major debt reductions.
In the case of Luxembourg this outcome likely reects its low public debt
ratios during the period under consideration.4 The other four countries,
4Luxembourg experienced a debt-to-GDP ratio of 7.4 percent on average during the
period 1985-2009.16
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however, experienced high debt ratios clearly exceeding the 60 percent
benchmark set by the Treaty of Maastricht but were not able to curb back
the debt ratios successfully.
3.2 Identifying factors that support major debt reduction
Governments of advanced economies have in general a limited number of
options to reduce their public debt. On the one hand they can adjust
scal policies by running sucient primary budget surpluses to lower their
debt. On the other hand they can create an environment conducive to
growth through the implementation of sound macroeconomic and structural
policies in order to \grow their way out" of indebtedness.
Two further options, ination and stock-ow adjustments are of limited
eect and not advisable for various reasons: Ination can only have a
short-term eect as its impact on debt works via surprise increases in the
price level. Once agents expect further ination increases, this will be
priced in yield expectations and thus burden public nances. Moreover,
such policies risk to unanchor ination expectations and thus contribute
to macroeconomic instability. From an institutional point of view, central
bank independence would risk to be undermined, possibly undermining
the credibility of domestic governance structures. Finally, given current
maturity proles and the share of debt nanced at variable rates, the
quantitative impact of surprise ination would likely be limited.
The eects on debt developments arising from stock-ow adjustments,
which comprise changes in the government stock of nancial assets and
changes in the value of foreign debt due to exchange rate uctuations, also
seem to provide little room for political manoeuvre. The accumulation of
nancial assets (e.g. via privatisations) has obvious limits. Since advanced17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1241
September 2010
economies mostly issue debt in their home currency, the relatively small
amount of public debt issued in foreign currencies with exible exchange
rates relative to the home currency oers little scope for debt reductions
via exchange rate movements.
In order to analyze the contributing factors we rst observe the underlying
macroeconomic dierences between episodes of debt accumulation and debt
reductions.
Table 3: Contributing factors to debt accumulation and reduction
Total Debt Debt Major debt Modest debt
sample accumulation reduction reduction reduction
public debt-to-GDP ratio 0.5 3.7 -2.6 -3.4 -2.3
Primary balance 1.5 0.2 2.8 4.0 2.3
primary expenditure ratio 0.2 0.7 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2
revenue ratio 0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Real GDP growth 2.6 1.5 3.6 3.8 3.5
Real GDP trend growth 2.6 2.2 3.0 3.4 2.8
Real output gap 0.0 -0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7
Real implied interest rate 3.9 4.2 3.6 4.2 3.3
No. of observations 375 184 191 59 132
Note: Figures display average annual values of all episodes under consideration using annual data for the EU-15
countries from 1985-2009. The real trend growth is derived by applying the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter to the real
GDP growth series for each EU-15 country over the period 1985-2009. The real output gap is then calculated as
the dierence between the real GDP growth and the trend growth.
Source: European Commission, 2009, AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic Data) database.
As can be seen in Table 3 the increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio was
mainly driven by low scal balances with increasing expenditure ratios in
an environment of sluggish trend growth. Whereas public debt reductions
mainly occurred during times of strong economic growth and were driven
by high primary balances induced by expenditure cuts.
Looking at major and modest debt reduction episodes, the average year-
on-year change in the debt ratio is much higher in the case of major debt
reductions than in the case of modest debt reductions. During the major
episodes debt was annually reduced by 3.4 percentage points on average,
while in the case of modest debt reductions the average year-on-year change
was about 2.3 percentage points. Looking at the potential drivers of a
major debt reduction, the primary balance seems to be a striking factor.18
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The primary surpluses were on average almost twice as high during the
episodes of major debt reductions if compared to the episodes of modest
debt reductions. This already indicates that pronounced tightening of scal
policies contributed importantly to major debt reductions.5 Further, it is
interesting to note that revenue increases do not seem to have induced debt
reductions, whereas cuts in primary expenditure seem to have contributed
signicantly in the case of major debt reductions.
Table 4: Change in interest burden during major public debt reductions
Period of
major debt Change in
reduction Interest burden interest burden




Belgium 1994-2007 10.8 3.9 -6.9
Denmark 1994-2007 6.7 1.6 -5.1
Finland 1997-2002 4.2 2.1 -2.1




Ireland 1994-2006 6.6 0.9 -5.7
Italy 1996-2003 11.6 5.2 -6.4
Luxembourg
Netherlands 1996-2002 5.6 2.8 -2.8
Portugal 1996-2000 5.8 3.1 -2.7
Spain 1997-2007 5.2 1.6 -3.6
Sweden 1985-1990 8.1 4.8 -3.3
1996-2000 5.3 3.5 -1.8
2003-2008 3.1 1.7 -1.4
UK 1985-1990 5.1 3.7 -1.4
1997-2002 3.6 2.0 -1.6
Source: European Commission, 2009, AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic Data) database.
It is also worth noting that major debt reductions mainly occurred in
times of higher interest burden or debt servicing cost. In particular, the
5Even though the cyclically adjusted primary balance would allow to adjust for the
inuences of the business cycle and therefore, entail more information about the eec-
tiveness of scal policies on debt reductions than the primary balance itself, we refrain
from using this measure for several reasons. First, cyclically adjusted primary balances
are not yet available in a comparable manner across the countries under consideration.
Second, this concept is subject to several drawbacks which are linked to methodological
problems in estimating budgetary sensitivities and trend growth as well as the disputable
and Momigliano 2005).
treatment of revenue windfalls and shortfalls (Jonung and Larch, 2006; Salto, 2005; Forni
,19
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requirement of the market participants to take on a government's debt only
in return for higher bond yields might have put pressure on governments to
substantially and persistently reduce public debt. Major debt reductions
may have become necessary to contain the self-reinforcement eect of
public debt accumulation arising from a positive dierential between the
implied interest rate and the GDP growth rate. As can be seen in Table
4 the high interest burden faced by the governments to renance the debt
might therefore have played a disciplinary role forcing the governments to
persistently curb back public debt.
4 Empirical analysis and results
In this section we assess empirically whether and to what extent the
factors discussed in the previous section aect the success of major debt
reductions. Our empirical investigation is based on a logistic model with
the aim to estimate the probability that the debt-to-GDP ratio will decline
by at least 10 percentage points in 5 consecutive years, conditional upon
information about the implementation of scal consolidation and upon the
macroeconomic environment.
Using a truncated panel data set of debt reduction years we estimate a
logistic probability model, dening
Pi = E[S = 1jZi] = eZi
1+eZi (1)
where E[S = 1jZi] is the conditional expectation of the success of a debt
reduction, given Zi, with
S =
(
1; in case of a major debt reduction
0; in case of a modest debt reduction
(2)20
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One can interpret equation 2 as the conditional probability that a major
debt reduction occurs given Zi, and
Zi = 0 + 1fi + 2PEXPi + 3trendgi + 4outputgi + 5burdeni (3)
where fi is the sum of the primary balance in the two years prior to the
debt reduction period. This controls for the eect that with sticky primary
decits debt reductions starting from high primary balance ratios will tend
to be more successful.6 PEXPi is a dummy variable, which controls for
the composition of the scal adjustment, i.e. whether or not the change
in primary expenditure is signicant vis- a-vis the change in the primary
balance. We construct the expenditure dummy as follows:
PEXPt =
(
1; if (PEXPt=pbt) > 
0; otherwise
(4)
A scal adjustment is dened as expenditure based if at least  percent of
the change in the primary budget balance in percent of GDP comes from
current expenditure cuts.
The explanatory variable trendgi represents the real trend growth computed
by applying the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter on the real GDP growth series for
each country under consideration over the period 1985-2009. The variable
outputgi represents the change in the output gap and is computed as the dif-
ference between real GDP growth and real trend growth. These explanatory
variables are supposed to absorb the eects of the business cycle on public
debt developments. The last variable that we consider is burdeni, which
represents the debt nancing costs as a percentage of GDP. It is included in
order to observe whether the interest burden has a stabilizing eect.
6Leaving out this control variable does not change the results materially.21
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In order to achieve more conclusive results on the structure of scal consoli-
dation which is more likely to lead to a major debt reduction we also assess
a slightly modied version of Zi by exchanging the expenditure dummy by
a revenue dummy.
Zi = 0 + 1fi + 2REVi + 3trendgi + 4outputgi + 5burdeni (5)
The revenue dummy is dened in an analogous way to the expenditure
dummy.7
4.1 Estimation results
The estimation results of the equations (3) and (5) are reported in Table
5. To address the fact that most of the episodes occurred consecutively
over a longer period of time which may result in autocorrelation in the er-
ror term, the estimation results are based on non-zero between cluster error
terms which correct for the potential heterogeneity between the independent
debt reduction periods. This allows us to specify that observations are inde-




1; if (REVt=pbt) > ;
0; otherwise22
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Table 5: Estimation results
Threshold for the Threshold for the
dummy variable dummy variable
 = 70  = 60
(1) (2) (1') (2')
Fiscal impulse 0.10** 0.09* 0.09* 0.09*





Trend growth 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Output gap -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Interest burden 0.23** 0.22** 0.22** 0.22**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant -3.76*** -3.49*** -3.65*** -3.46***
(0.85) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83)
No. of observations 191 191 191 191
No. of major debt reductions 59 59 59 59
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13
Wald 2 (5) statistics 14.09 11.72 13.00 11.04
Marginal eects
Fiscal impulse 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
PEXP 0.16 0.11
REV 0.01 -0.01
Trend growth 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Output gap -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Interest burden 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Note: Cluster robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate statistical signicance at 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively. Marginal eects (dP/dZ) indicate the marginal change in the probability of
success for the average values of the independent variables. In case of dummy variables the marginal eects refer
to the discrete change from 0 to 1.
Our results suggest that the composition of the scal adjustment plays an
important role in explaining the success of a debt reduction. The expendi-
ture dummy which reects the size of the change in the primary expenditure
relative to the change in the primary balance has the expected positive
sign and is statistically signicant. The results indicate that the discrete
change of the expenditure dummy from 0 to 1 increases the probability of
a major debt reduction by more than 10 percent. The revenue dummy,
on the other hand, turns out to be statistically insignicant. Therefore,
it seems that expenditure-based consolidations have a higher probability
to succeed, while tax increases are less likely to contribute to a large and
persistent debt reduction.23
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Further, our results suggest that real trend growth is an important
factor determining the success of a debt reduction. A one percent increase
in real trend growth increases the probability of a major debt reduction
by nine percent. The change in the output gap, however, turns out to
be statistically insignicant. Against this background, our results suggest
that the implementation of sound macroeconomic and structural policies
promoting growth is crucial for a major debt reduction because it helps
countries to \grow their way out" of indebtedness. Here, the literature also
points to a positive feedback eect with decisive expenditure-based scal
consolidation because this type of consolidation appears to foster growth,
in particular in times of severe scal imbalances (see Section 2.2. and the
literature quoted there, in particular, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990 and 1996;
Alesina and Perotti, 1995 and 1997; Afonso et al., 2006). The control
variable on the level of the primary balance prior to the debt reduction has
the expected positive sign. As expected, ination does not contribute to
major debt reductions. Further, the negative and signicant constant term
might reect the political-economy induced debt-decit bias.
Another factor which determines the success of a debt reduction is the
interest burden. It turns out to be statistically signicant and has a positive
sign. A one percent increase in the interest burden increases the probability
of a major debt reduction by ve percent. This nding supports the view
that the increase in debt servicing cost faced by governments to renance
their debt plays a disciplinary role strengthened by market forces. Because
nancial markets are only willing to take on more of government debt in
return for higher bond yields, this sets a strong incentive for governments
to consolidate forcefully.24
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4.2 Identifying the composition of government expenditure
cuts
In the next step we analyze which types of government expenditure cuts
are more likely to lead to a major debt reduction. The following ve com-
ponents are considered: (a) subsidies paid by the general government, (b)
social benets including social security benets, retirement pensions paid
by autonomous pension funds and social assistance benets such as child
allowances and welfare benets, (c) government consumption of goods and
services, (d) compensation of employees including salaries, wages and em-
ployers' social contributions and (e) the gross xed capital formation of the
government.
Table 6: Characteristics of expenditure-based consolidations
Debt Major debt Modest debt
reduction reduction reduction
No. of episodes 191 59 132
No. of debt reduction episodes
with: PEXPt=pbt > 60 58 22 36
Of which average annual change in:
Total expenditure -1.97 -2.07 -1.87
Subsidies -0.13 -0.16 -0.10
Social benets -0.62 -0.69 -0.55
Government consumption -0.48 -0.54 -0.42
Compensation of employees -0.33 -0.37 -0.28
Gross xed capital formation -0.10 -0.07 -0.12
Source: European Commission, AMECO (Annual Macroeconomic Data) database
Of all the 191 debt reduction episodes 58 episodes included an expenditure-
based consolidation according to our denition. Table 6 displays the year-on-
year changes of the government expenditure components during the time of
expenditure-based consolidations for the major and modest debt reduction
episodes. As can be seen in Table 6 expenditure cuts were more pronounced
in the case of major debt reductions than in the case of modest debt re-
ductions. The only exception seems to be the gross xed capital formation
component. Further, it is worth noting that especially the cuts in social
benets seem to be relatively high, followed by government consumption
and the compensation of employees.25
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In order to assess whether and to what extent the expenditure components
aect the success of large debt reductions, we estimate the previously dened
logistic model with slightly modied versions of Zi of the following general
form:
Zi = 0 + 1fi + 2trendgi + 3outputgi + 4burdeni + 5dummyi (6)
The variable dummyi now controls for the composition of the government
expenditure cuts, i.e. whether or not the change in the expenditure com-
ponent is signicant vis- a-vis the change in the primary expenditure cuts.




1; if (Comt=PEXPt) > 
0; otherwise
(7)
The dummy variable takes the value of one, if the change of the expenditure
component vis- a-vis the change of the primary expenditure is higher than
its average value among all expenditure-based consolidations and it takes
the value of zero otherwise. The results are presented in Table 7.26
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Table 7: Estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal impulse 0.09* 0.10** 0.09* 0.10** 0.09*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Trend growth 0.45*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.42***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Output gap -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Interest burden 0.24** 0.23** 0.22** 0.23** 0.23**







Compensation of employees 1.12**
(0.49)
Gross xed capital formation -0.05
(0.42)
Constant -3.57*** -3.86*** -3.58*** -3.80*** -3.47***
(0.87) (0.81) (0.83) (0.86) (0.82)
No. of observations 191 191 191 191 191
No. of major debt reductions 59 59 59 59 59
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.13
LR (5) statistics 12.14 31.62 12.50 14.73 10.85
Marginal eects
Fiscal impulse 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Trend growth 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Output gap 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00




Compensation of employees 0.26
Gross xed capital formation -0.01
Note: Cluster robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate statistical signicance at 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively. Marginal eects (dP/dZ) indicate the marginal change in the probability of
success for the average values of the independent variables. In case of dummy variables the marginal eects refer
to the discrete change from 0 to 1.
The estimation results indicate that expenditure-based consolidation which
mainly concentrates on cuts in social benets and government wages is more
likely to lead to a major debt reduction. A signicant decline in social ben-
ets or public wages vis- a-vis the overall decline in the primary expenditure
will increase the probability of a major debt reduction by 31 and 26 percent,
respectively. Sizeable cuts in government subsidies, government consump-
tion and gross xed capital formation, on the other hand, turned out to be
insignicant in explaining the success of a debt reduction.27
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4.3 Robustness tests
The robustness of our results is tested by the following measures: (1)
accounting for panel heterogeneity across countries and (2) using an
alternative denition of a major debt reduction episode. All in all, the
results of the alternative specications indicate that the reported results
seem to be robust to variations of the logistic probability model.
Since panel heterogeneity may result in autocorrelation in the error terms
due to country-specic eects, we reestimate the logit specications con-
trolling for the dierences of the countries under consideration. This allows
us to specify that observations are independent across countries but not
necessarily independent within a country. Table 8 in the Appendix shows
that in general the results are robust if compared with the baseline results.
Further, we test the model using an alternative denition of a major debt
reduction. The alternative that we take into consideration refers to a more
demanding threshold for the cumulative debt reduction. In this case we
dene an episode as successful, if the debt-to-GDP ratio declines by 15
percentage points in 5 consecutive years. One drawback of this denition
is, however, that it reduces the number of major episodes. Table 9 in the
Appendix reports the results using a threshold of 15 percentage points.
Again, the results are broadly consistent with our baseline model.28
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5 Conclusions
Many of the EU-15 countries will have to undertake policy measures in
the near future to reverse the trend of rising debt ratios. Therefore, the
question of how to successfully reduce public debt is of eminent interest.
Based on the estimation of dierent specications of a logistic probability
model over the period 1985-2009, our results indicate that especially
the composition of the scal adjustment, the real trend GDP growth
and the interest burden are crucial factors in explaining the success of a
debt reduction. The results are robust to alternative thresholds for the
identication of major debt reductions and the composition dummies.
First, our results suggest that major debt reductions are mainly driven by
decisive and lasting (rather than timid and short-lived) scal consolidation
eorts focused on reducing government expenditure, in particular, cuts in
social benets and public wages. Revenue-based consolidations do not seem
to contribute to a major debt reduction.
Second, robust real GDP growth also increases the likelihood of a major
debt reduction because it helps countries to \grow their way out" of
indebtedness. Short-term uctuations in the business cycle, however,
do not seem to aect the success of a debt reduction. The literature
also points to a positive feedback eect of decisive expenditure-based
scal consolidation to growth because this type of consolidation seems
to foster growth, in particular in times of severe scal imbalances (for a
literature review see Section 2.2). In this regard, our results present a
starting point for further research: given that periods of strong growth
by themselves facilitate a reduction in expenditure ratios, there is a risk
that the underlying policy eort in such periods is overestimated. In29
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other words, the reduction in expenditure ratios reects less an active
scal policy tightening but rather a windfall from an overall favourable
(if unsustainable) economic environment. Further research could try to
disentangle the precise scal impacts of such particularly favourable periods.
Third, high debt servicing costs play a disciplinary role and require gov-
ernments to set up credible plans to stop and reverse the increasing debt
ratios. Because nancial markets are only willing to take on more of gov-
ernment debt in return for higher bond yields, this sets a strong incentive
for governments to consolidate forcefully.30
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Appendix
Table 8: Estimation results: Panel heterogeneity clusters
Threshold for the Threshold for the
dummy variable dummy variable
 = 70  = 60





Trend growth 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Output gap -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Interest burden 0.23** 0.22** 0.22** 0.22**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant -3.76*** -3.49*** -3.65*** -3.46***
(0.77) (0.77) (0.78) (0.79)
No. of observations 191 191 191 191
No. of major debt reductions 59 59 59 59
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13
Wald 2 (5) statistics 29.93 30.93 28.86 29.29
Marginal eects
Fiscal impulse 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
PEXP 0.16 0.11
REV 0.01 -0.01
Trend growth 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Output gap -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Interest burden 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Note: Cluster robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate statistical signicance at 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively. Marginal eects (dP/dZ) indicate the marginal change in the probability of
success for the average values of the independent variables. In case of dummy variables the marginal eects refer
to the discrete change from 0 to 1.
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Table 9: Estimation results: Threshold 15 percentage points
Threshold for the Threshold for the
dummy variable dummy variable
 = 70  = 60





Trend growth 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.43***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Output gap -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Interest burden 0.26** 0.26** 0.25* 0.25**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Constant -4.77*** -4.41*** -4.60*** -4.38***
(1.00) (0.90) (0.96) (0.90)
No. of observations 191 191 191 191
No. of major debt reductions 38 38 38 38
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16
Wald 2 (5) statistics 19.93 25.65 20.94 23.72
Marginal eects
Fiscal impulse 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
PEXP 0.13 0.08
REV -0.03 -0.04
Trend growth 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Output gap 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Interest burden 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Note: Cluster robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate statistical signicance at 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively. Marginal eects (dP/dZ) indicate the marginal change in the probability of
success for the average values of the independent variables. In case of dummy variables the marginal eects refer
to the discrete change from 0 to 1.
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